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Due Process Limits on Accomplice 
Liability 
Michael G. Heyman† 
In a prior piece in this journal, I noted some disturbing de-
velopments in the law of accomplice liability.1  By definition, 
complicity law attaches guilt to the accomplice for the criminal 
acts of others.2  Thus, no matter how trivial the assistance or 
commitment, she is as guilty as the actual criminal actor.3 The 
notion of guilt for subsequent crimes committed by confeder-
ates magnifies this injustice, resulting in the conviction of the 
innocent through the deployment of some version of the “natu-
ral and probable consequences doctrine.”4  The application of 
that doctrine results in her conviction for all subsequent offens-
es, provided they meet the criteria for natural and probable.5  
Unfortunately, since no functional criteria exist, it provides a 
form of absolute, vicarious liability, dispensing with any re-
quirement for personal conduct or culpability. 
That prior piece noted the strengthening, even expansion, 
of that doctrine through recent case law.6 Worse, it is now en-
shrined in the statutes of Illinois, capturing it as the doctrine of 
“common design.”7  Though in utter conflict with other relevant 
statutory provisions, its robust survival attests to its traction, 
and its codification appears to forestall future attacks.  So, too, 
for the dozens of versions of that doctrine existing among the 
 
†   Professor Emeritus, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago).  
Copyright © 2015 by Michael G. Heyman.  
 1. Michael G. Heyman, Clinging to the Common Law in an Age of Stat-
utes:  Criminal Law in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES  29 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 31. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doc-
trine: A Case Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388 
(2010). 
 6. Heyman, supra note 1. 
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states, usually parading under that rubric of natural and prob-
able.  
However, relief may come from a two-pronged Due Process 
challenge.  First, Due Process clearly requires proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.  Worse than conclusive presumptions 
of guilt, “common design” and its siblings attach guilt without 
any proof at all.  It’s automatic, once satisfied.  Moreover, these 
notions also fail because void for vagueness. There’s nothing 
meaningful to satisfy.  Not reducible to any workable decisional 
rules, they provide unfettered discretion throughout the system 
for standardless, arbitrary accusations and convictions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The frequent subject of criticism, American accomplice law 
is a “disgrace.”8  Unlike some of its European counterparts, it 
doesn’t distinguish among degrees or levels of participation, in-
stead treating all actors alike, however peripheral their in-
volvement.  All are as guilty as the actual perpetrator, and the 
punishment potentially the same.9  Indeed, elsewhere, I dis-
cussed the case of a nineteen-year-old boy sentenced to ten 
years in prison as an accomplice to a drug sale.10 
Walking with a friend who unexpectedly encountered a 
drug dealer, he translated a few words of Spanish between the 
two.11  A sale occurred.12 That triggered California’s mandatory 
sentencing laws and that ten-year sentence.13  But at least he 
did something (albeit minimal) that furthered the transaction.  
Under the doctrines discussed here, he would have been liable 
for any further crimes committed by his friend, provided they 
passed under the banner of “common design.”14  Greatly magni-
fying the existing injustice of complicity law, that result is 
wholly unacceptable. 
The Supreme Court recently addressed this injustice, in 
 
 8. Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance As a 
Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 427 (2008). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Michael G. Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar 
Law of Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 133 (2013). 
 11. Id. at 133–34. 
 12. Id. at 133. 
 13. Id.  
 14. I will use both common design and natural and probable language 
hereafter, hopefully without creating confusion.  They are alike in providing 
virtually automatic liability for criminal conduct in which the accused did not 
participate, though slightly different in theory, as the latter is founded on a 
causal model.  Nevertheless, both are  repugnant to Due Process. 
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the context of a sentencing enhancement provision in federal 
law.15  That provision augmented the punishment for a drug 
trafficking if the violator used or carried a gun in connection 
with the offense.16  Though the perpetrator had, Rosemond was 
unaware that he even possessed a gun at that time.17  Fre-
quently emphasizing the relationship between “choice” and 
moral and legal responsibility, the Court reversed the convic-
tion.18  Repeatedly, Justice Kagan insisted that liability re-
quired that “defendant’s knowledge of a firearm must be ad-
vance knowledge—or otherwise said, knowledge that enables 
him to make the relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice.”19 
But that decision required an instruction on mens rea, be-
cause the federal statutes apparently required it, or at least the 
majority read in such a requirement, consistent with a long 
string of its cases basing criminal liability on personal wrong-
doing.  It did not hold that Due Process requires it.  However, 
in our context, any scheme attaching guilt without proof, in-
deed where there is nothing required to be proved, fails any 
Due Process scrutiny.  
LIABILITY AND PROOF OF GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
All case law chatter about common design (and natural 
and probable) shares a common flaw, thus losing sight of some-
thing painfully fundamental: it fails to specify the elements 
that comprise it.  Remarkably, these discussions sometimes 
consist of recitations from Nineteenth Century cases dealing 
with watermelon thieves and the like.  There, on an entirely 
different legal landscape, courts spoke vaguely about “criminal 
purpose,” “hazardous” enterprises and the liability of con-
conspirators for the acts of all.20 Unfortunately, more recent 
case law more candidly concedes that convicting based on 
common design only requires proof of the target crime—or less.  
As I explained in that earlier piece in this journal, in March, 
2014 the Illinois Supreme Court responded chillingly to the 
 
 15. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). 
 16. Id. at 1243. 
 17. Id. at 1252. 
 18. Id. at 1249. 
 19. Id.  
 20. See, for example, the reliance on just such nonsense in People v. Kess-
ler, 57 Ill.2d 493, 497–98 (1974).  That case arose under the current Illinois 
scheme, one patterned after the Model Penal Code, and its requirement for 
personal wrongdoing by the accomplice in furthering the criminal endeavor. 
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state’s assertions from its brief.21 
Specifically, the state claimed that defendant, in “conced-
ing his guilt for the burglary . . . has effectively conceded his 
guilt for the aggravated discharge of a firearm.”22 Embracing 
that view, the Court said “that is exactly right.”23 With that, it 
conflated proof of guilt for the target crime with that for subse-
quent crimes.  That constitutes a clear Constitutional violation, 
as common design acts as a rhetorical expedient, thus obviating 
any need to actually prove defendants’ guilt. 
In re Winship properly exalted the presumption of inno-
cence and the linked requirement of proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.24  There, New York State insisted that Due Pro-
cess need not extend that standard of proof to a juvenile 
proceeding.25  Emphatically rejecting that position, the Court 
noted that “a society that values the good name and freedom of 
every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a 
crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”26 It thus 
extended that standard to proof of all “facts” necessary to prove 
guilt. But apologists for common design would argue its conso-
nance with that standard, as these cases all apply it.  But do 
they? 
Just as Winship condemned forsaking the reasonable doubt 
standard explicitly, cases following it have condemned mecha-
nisms that subvert it sub rosa.  Despite their intricacy, these 
cases read Winship to prohibit burden-shifting mechanisms as 
well as conclusive presumptions, when those mechanisms re-
lieve the prosecution of its full burden of proof.   
Key here is Sandstrom v. Montana.27 There the judge, in-
structing the jury on mens rea, told it that “the law presumes 
that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his volun-
tary acts.”28 Although potentially understood by the jury as a 
permissive inference, a unanimous Court nevertheless reversed 
 
 21. Heyman, supra note 1 at 34–35. 
 22. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, at 6, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2014/115527.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2015). 
 23. Id. 
 24. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 363–64.  The Court said “we explicitly hold that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he 
is charged.” Id. at 364. 
 27. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
 28. Id. at 512. 
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the conviction, as the jury could have been misled by the in-
struction.  It could have either determined that mere proof of 
the defendant’s acts triggered an irrebuttable presumption of 
guilt, or that the defendant had to disprove the essential fact of 
his mental state once the act had been proved.  As the Court 
concluded, either possibility “would have deprived defendant of 
his right to the due process of law” and thus was unconstitu-
tional.29 
But presumptions exist throughout the law, providing a 
kind of metaphysical bridge between the known and the un-
clear.  For example, Sandstrom was convicted of murder.30  Had 
the judge told the jury that the state must prove the intent to 
kill, but it might infer that in beating the woman with a scoop 
shovel and stabbing her, he intended to cause her death that 
would have been permissible.  As one commentator has noted, a 
presumption is constitutionally valid, provided the existence of 
a “significant correlation between the proved facts and the fact 
inferred is inconclusive.”31   
However, nothing like that is at work here.  Instead, we’re 
dealing with doctrine that automatically breaches that gap up-
on proof of the target offense.  Indeed, no gap in knowledge ex-
ists, as we have the simple formula of guilt for offense one re-
sults in that for all subsequent offenses.  Winship is clearly 
violated. 
Indeed, common design is even worse than it appears.  In 
most places, the natural and probable approach results in guilt 
for subsequent crimes, provided the defendant was an active 
participant in the target offense.  Common design, by contrast, 
is pure imputed liability, not even requiring any criminal con-
duct at all by the accused.32 For that reason, it violates the 
Constitutional mandate that criminal statutes must provide 
citizens with fair warning of prohibited activities, a warning 
clearly embodied in precise decisional rules, to avoid arbitrary 
law enforcement.   
 
 29. Id. at 524. 
 30. Id. at 513. 
 31. Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship:  A Comment on 
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 
MICH. L. REV. 30, 59 (1978). 
 32. See Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 
638 (1984) (criticizing natural and probable variants as often being supported 
by “weak causal connections” as well as requiring no personal culpability). 
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THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS REQUIREMENT 
Typically, this Constitutional doctrine has been applied to 
render void vague criminal statutes, dealing with such matters 
a loitering, vagrancy, status crimes and the like.  That’s its fair 
warning component, requiring that proscribed conduct be clear-
ly specified.   
But it likewise condemns laws that vest “virtually complete 
discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the 
suspect has satisfied [its requirements].”33 Due Process, then, 
requires both fair warning and clear decisional rules for all, in-
cluding prosecutors and the courts that apply the law and in-
struct juries on it.  Without that clarity, laws are simply unjus-
tified and cannot stand. 
People v. Phillips demonstrates just how violently common 
design violates this mandate.34 There, Phillips and another set 
out to avenge an attack on his ex-girlfriend.  Realizing the op-
position was too great, they abandoned their plan and set out 
for home.35  However, before leaving, his companion fired a sin-
gle shot from a .22-caliber rifle indiscriminately in the direction 
of the crowd, killing one member.36  The two were convicted of 
aggravated discharge of a firearm, unlawful possession of a 
weapon by a felon and, worst, first degree murder.37  That was 
so, though Phillips personally committed no crime at all.38 
Affirming his conviction on all counts, the Illinois appellate 
court sounded like the mirror image of the Court in Rose-
mond.39 Whereas Justice Kagan repeatedly premised liability 
on personal fault, this Court utterly dispensed with that re-
quirement or, more accurately perhaps, found wrongdoing in 
simply setting out to commit a crime.  Thus, it said “[E]ven if 
Grimes had hidden the rifle from defendant, or found the rifle 
on the ground after he stepped outside defendant’s view, de-
fendant would still be guilty of first degree murder. By setting 
out to commit a crime with Grimes, defendant rendered himself 
legally accountable for Grimes’s shooting of Maclin.”40 
Attempting to justify this remarkable result, it flailed 
 
 33. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). 
 34. People v. Phillips, 2014 IL App (4th) 120695 appeal denied, No. 
118050, 2014 WL 4799683 (Ill. Sept. 24, 2014). 
 35. Id. at *2. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). 
 40. Phillips, 2014 WL 4799683, at *8 (emphasis added). 
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about citing to the felony-murder doctrine, even though that 
(oft repudiated) doctrine carries its own basis for liability.  
However, ultimately, talking tough, the Illinois Court said “the 
common-design rule provides harsh medicine for those who 
willingly join with others to engage in criminal acts.”41  Those 
last few words underscore the extraordinary scope of this Con-
stitutional violation. 
Assuming a state is free to enact laws along the lines of 
common design, it must do so carefully to protect the liberty in-
terest of its citizens.  Consider the difficulties involved in craft-
ing workable attempt statutes, for example.  Providing a poten-
tially open-ended basis for liability, attempt law has been 
closely scrutinized, and the Model Penal Code finally arrived at 
the substantial step test, an approach highlighting the salience 
of personal wrongdoing.42 
No such limitations exist within common design as consti-
tuted.  Nothing in the statute or case law remotely cabins it.  
Thus, there’s no indication of the point along the path at which 
liability attaches, of how far the non-actor must go to be liable 
for subsequent acts.  Presumably it consists of more than the 
act of agreement, but perhaps not.43  Moreover, whereas at-
tempt law (codified in the Illinois statutes) has an express act 
requirement, common design has none.  Perhaps the mere 
criminal combination is the core basis for liability. How close 
must the relationship be between or among actors?  Would 
presence in a mob or gang alone suffice?  But these questions 
assume too much, assuming a doctrine that somewhere has a 
fixed meaning, yet to be uncovered.  Because it has none, it ut-
terly fails Due Process analysis.  And, juries are just told the 
gobbledygook of common design and nothing else, with the ex-
pected results. 
IF YOU CAN’T EXPLAIN IT IN PLAIN ENGLISH, IT MAY 
BE PLAIN NONSENSE. 
Amazingly, common design does not even admit to the pos-
 
 41. Id. 
 42. MODEL PENAL CODE Pt. I: General Provisions (Official Draft and Re-
vised Comments 1985), Pt. II: Definition of Specific Crimes (Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1980).  Section 5.01 expressly requires culpability as well 
as conduct “strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.”  Id. 
 43. The statute does say, however, that liability is predicated on entry in-
to a common design “or agreement.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c) 
(West 2010).  That surely can be interpreted to create liability at the very ear-
liest point, and even dispense with any involvement beyond that point on the 
part of the “accomplice.” 
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sibility of a defense.  So long as a connection to the actual 
wrongdoer is established and the criminal conduct proved, lia-
bility inescapably attaches.  In theory, that does not hold true 
for the natural and probable variant, as it speaks in causal 
terms that can be attacked or otherwise not satisfied.  In theo-
ry.  Whereas “common design” is arguably based on a double 
misnomer, as it is neither, natural and probable has its own in-
ternal incoherence.  There, following a mechanistic model, ad-
herents are positing pathological human behavior as both nat-
ural and probable.  Despite the admittedly criminal context, 
that is still odd. 
California provides various sentences for attempted mur-
der.44  The punishment may be five, seven or nine years.  How-
ever, if it is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” it carries a 
term of life imprisonment.45  Brandon Favor was part of a 
group that robbed a liquor store.46  During that robbery, his co-
defendants committed murder and attempted murder.47  For 
the latter offense, the jury found that it met the standards for 
life imprisonment.48  However, the jury was only instructed 
that if it found that attempted murder was “reasonably fore-
seeable,” it could convict Favor on a natural and probable con-
sequence basis.49  It was not asked to find further whether a 
“premeditated” attempted murder was foreseeable. 
The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, over 
a vigorous dissent by Goodwin Liu.  In large part, the Court di-
vided over the fact that attempted murder is but one crime, and 
a finding of premeditation simply triggers a harsher sentence, 
based on the jury’s finding.  But that’s largely sophistry, in that 
the perpetrators had to have premeditated to be found guilty, 
and natural and probable seems to require that their “conduct” 
was foreseeable. Accordingly, Justice Liu posed the question: 
“How can defendant be convicted of premeditated attempted 
murder on a natural and probable consequences theory when 
the jury was never asked to determine whether premeditated 
attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of 
the target offense?”50 Since Winship requires proof of all neces-
sary “facts,” premeditation was a fact of the assailant’s conduct, 
 
 44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. People v. Favor, 54 Cal. 4th 868, 872 (2012). 
 47. Id. at 872–73. 
 48. Id. at 874. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 882 (Goodwin, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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and Justice Liu is correct. 
But we enter a kind of never-never land, as we try to con-
nect natural and probable to California’s definition of premedi-
tated murder.  An instruction on liability for the lesser versions 
would require that the non-participant foresaw that his confed-
erates would try to kill someone.  When we add premeditation 
and deliberation to this mix, liability would require foresight of 
that intent to kill plus the additional factors of their precon-
ceived plan and their reflection on that objective, all in the con-
text of the chaos of a robbery.  This pyramiding of prescience 
simply cannot be sensibly explained to jurors, or anyone for 
that matter.   
This doctrine thus produces bizarre, unjustifiable results, 
as in the conviction of a robber for the rape committed by his 
confederate, on the thinking that the business robbed had an 
“aura” of sexuality about it.51  It is sheer nonsense to yoke no-
tions of natural and probable to human choices, with the result 
being liability for terribly serious offenses never considered by 
the defendant.  Moreover, unguided by any workable standards 
for affixing blame, juries are left to guess—or worse. 
This absence of clear decisional rules, explainable in func-
tional language demonstrates the deep Constitutional defects of 
both common design and natural and probable.  Leaving so 
much to guesswork makes a mockery of the presumption of in-
nocence, resulting in the conviction of the innocent in violation 
of all Constitutional norms. 
CLOSING REFLECTIONS 
That necessary link between personal fault and criminal 
liability is too basic, too fundamental to even require explana-
tion.  It so inheres in our notion of criminal responsibility as 
not even to require justification, as we cannot properly assign 
blame—or even conceive of doing so—in the absence of personal 
wrongdoing.  Clearly, the doctrines under discussion conflict 
with these core notions of fault and punishment. 
This translates into a notion of substantive Due Process 
that cannot tolerate punishment without fault, thus condemn-
ing these doctrines.  Perhaps Justice Kagan’s language reflects 
 
 51. The California statute on complicity assigns liability to those who are 
“concerned in the commission of an offense.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West).  
Accordingly, in People v. Nguyen, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 332 (Ct. App. 1993), 
natural and probable produced liability for rape to an accomplice to robbery of 
a massage salon on this sexual aura theory. 
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that.52  But those comments do not stand alone.  Analyzing 
decades of Supreme Court opinions, one commentator noted 
that: 
At its core, the rule prohibits ‘guilt by association’ in the 
absence of a substantial relationship between the defendant 
and the third party’s criminal activity. An individual cannot be 
held vicariously liable merely because she associates with a 
group or third party that commits a crime. There must be a suf-
ficient, ‘non-tenuous,’ link between her association and the 
third party’s criminal actions.53 
Neglected too long by commentators, this topic has begun 
to develop some salience among criminal theorists.54 As the 
quoted passage indicates, for decades the Court has addressed 
this indissoluble, indispensable link between fault and liability.  
But, as it is unlikely that legislatures will voluntarily address 
these issues, perhaps only a Constitutional challenge along the 
lines described here can help restore the law to a more just and 
humane state. 
 
 
 52. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). 
 53. Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Di-
mensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 606 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
 54. See, for example, Robinson, supra note 32.  Indeed, for a fascinating, 
comprehensive analysis, see Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due 
Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91 (2006). 
